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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - PLEA 
BARGAINS - CONSTITUTION HELD TO AFFORD CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS A RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF 
PLEA PROPOSALS UNDER APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
COOPER v. UNITED STATES, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Cooper v. United States,l an OpInIOn filed in 1979 by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, constitutional 
protection was afforded a criminal defendant whose reasonable 
expectations were frustrated by the prosecution's withdrawal of a 
plea-bargain proposal.2 The court held that under "appropriate 
circumstances" constitutional safeguards of fifth amendment due 
process and sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 
may prohibit the prosecution from withdrawing its proposal even 
though no contract has been formed between the parties and the 
defendant has not relied upon the proposal to his detriment.3 Prior to 
Cooper, defendants were afforded a remedy for the withdrawal of 
plea proposals only in situations in which they had relied to their 
detriment upon the prosecutor's promise (usually by entering a 
guilty plea) and the prosecutor had subsequently breached the 
agreement.4 
II. THE FACTS 
The sequence of events in the Cooper plea negotiations was 
relatively simple. Cooper, who earlier had cooperated with the 
government as an informant and witness, was slated to stand trial on 
charges of obstruction of justice and bribery of a witness.s Two 
1. 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979). 
2. Plea bargaining is the negotiation process by which the prosecution and a 
criminal defendant arrive at a mutually acceptable compromise. Typically, in 
exchange for the defendant's entry of a plea other than "not guilty," the 
prosecution will attempt to mitigate the penalty incurred by the defendant -
for example, by moving for dismissal of other charges in the case, by not 
prosecuting unrelated charges pending against the defendant, or by recom-
mending to the court that less than the maximum sentence be imposed. FEI>. R. 
CRIM. P. IHe); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PL~;AS 
OF GUILTY § 3.l<b) (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA PLEASj. 
3. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 (4th Cir. 1979). 
4. See Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea 
Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Broken Plea 
Bargains]. 
5. Cooper was charged with having offered to remove himself as a witness in a 
drug violation case in exchange for $10,000. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 
12, 14 (4th Cir. 1979>. 
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months before the scheduled trial, his defense counsel entered into 
plea negotiations with an Assistant United States Attorney. On the 
morning of May 11, 1977, these negotiations resulted in a plea 
proposal in which the prosecutor offered to bring Cooper's coopera-
tion to the judge's attention and to dismiss all but one of the 
indictments in exchange for Cooper's plea of guilty to a count of 
obstruction of justice, his continued incarceration and cooperation 
with the government, and his testimony at other trials. 6 With this 
proposal in hand, defense counsel went immediately to see Cooper 
and, by noon of the same day, had his assent to the proposal and 
called the office of the Assistant United States Attorney to notify 
him of Cooper's acceptance. Defense counsel was unable to reach the 
prosecuting attorney until about 3:00 that afternoon.7 In the interim, 
the Assistant United States Attorney was advised by his superior to 
withdraw the proposal. When defense counsel finally spoke with the 
prosecutor he was informed of the withdrawal of the proposal before 
he could convey Cooper's acceptance. Protest of this action to the 
United States Attorney's office was unavailing, and the district court 
denied the defendant's motion to enforce the proposal. Cooper was 
subsequently convicted on all counts and sentenced to fifteen years 
imprisonment.8 This appeal to the Fourth Circuit followed. 
III. THE LEGITIMATION OF PLEA BARGAINING 
Today, over ninety percent of criminal prosecutions are disposed 
of through guilty pleas.9 Of those cases, a substantial number are the 
result of plea bargains. lO Administratively, due to crowded dockets 
and limited prosecutorial resources, plea bargaining has become a 
"bureaucratic necessity"ll upon which the criminal justice system 
depends. 12 Despite the frequent use of plea bargaining, the technique 
remained until recently a "sub rosa process shrouded in secrecy and 
deliberately concealed by participating defendants, defense lawyers, 
prosecutors, and even judges."13 For only a short time has plea 
6. Id. at 15. 
7.Id. 
8.Id. 
9. ABA PLEAS, supra note 2, note at 60; Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its 
History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979); Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 
YALE L.J. 286 (1972). 
10. ABA PLEAS, supra note 2, note at 60. 
11. Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken Promises, 11 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 774 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Legitimation of Plea 
Bargains]. 
12. Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United 
States District Courts, 62 F.R.D. 271, 281 (1974) (see note to amend. FED. R. 
CRIM. P. ll(e». 
13. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977). 
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bargaining been recognized as "an acceptable and even desirable 
part of the administration of criminal justice."'4 
Judicial recognition of the legality of plea bargains first occurred 
in Brady v. United States. 15 In that case, the defendant, prompted in 
part by the prosecution's promise to recommend that the death 
sentence not be imposed, entered a plea of guilty. After his 
conviction, he challenged the constitutionality of the plea bargain on 
fifth amendment grounds, asserting that fear of the death penalty 
had caused him to incriminate himself. The Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the plea bargain, stating "we cannot hold 
that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a 
defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State."16 
The Court stressed, however, that a guilty plea is a "grave and 
solemn act,"17 and therefore must be entered voluntarily IS and 
intelligently.'9 A defendant's overestimation of the strength of the 
state's case or the potential severity of his sentence, however, was 
held not to vitiate the intelligence and voluntariness of his guilty 
plea.20 In Brady, plea bargaining received the approbation of the 
judiciary, opening the door to scrutiny of the technique by the courts. 
Cases subsequent to Brady have developed four criteria by which 
the validity of plea bargains and subsequent guilty pleas is assessed. 
In addition to the requirements of intelligence and voluntariness, 
fairness must be present throughout the entire negotiation process, 21 ~ 
14. Legitimation of Plea Bargains, supra note 11, at 771-72. The reasons offered for 
judicial acceptance of this once clandestine procedure include: prompt disposi-
tion of cases; shortening of pretrial confinement; protection of the public from 
criminals released on bail; shortening of the time between the charge and the 
disposition; enhancement of rehabilitative prospects; lessening of defendant's 
exposure to the criminal process and potentially severe penalties; and 
conservation of scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources. Blackledge v. 
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 
(1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); State v. Brockman, 
277 Md. 687, 693, 357 A.2d 376, 380-81 (1976). 
15. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Accord, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970>; 
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970>. For a discussion of the historical 
origins of plea bargaining, see Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979), See also Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining; Compromises 
By Prosecutors To Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964). 
16. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970), 
17. [d. at 748. 
18. [d. at 755. 
19. [d. at 756. 
20. [d. at 757. 
21. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); State v. Kuchenreuther, 218 
N.W.2d 621, 624 <Iowa 1974) (state's breach of a plea agreement described by 
the court as "nothing less than an intolerable violation of our time-honored fair 
play norm, and accepted professional standards"); State v. Brockman, 277 Md.' 
687, 697, 357 A.2d 376, 382-83 (1976) (the standard "applied to plea 
negotiations is one of fair play and equity under the facts and circumstances of 
the case"). 
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and a defendant must be represented by competent counseP2 In 
applying these criteria during the post-Brady era, the courts have 
had difficulty safeguarding defendants' constitutional rights while, 
at the same time, protecting society's interest in safety and crime 
prevention. 
The failure to satisfy anyone of these four criteria may result in 
the plea bargain being found invalid. For example, a plea given 
inadvertently, or without a full understanding of the consequences, 
is invalid,23 as would be a bargain arising from secret offers made by 
the prosecution and accompanied by threats that the defendant not 
discuss them with his attorney.24 Similarly, relief will be afforded a 
defendant if a prosecutor lacking authority breaches a promise he 
cannot fulfill.25 On the other hand, courts have held that a valid offer 
may be structured so as to encourage the defendant to plead guilty.26 
IV. THE COOPER RATIONALE 
The Cooper court was faced with a situation in which the 
prosecutor's actions did not constitute a breach under traditional 
contract analysis. Even so, in providing the defendant a remedy, the 
court relied on Santobello v. New York, 27 a Supreme Court decision 
22. While this is not yet a unanimous conclusion, there is growing recognition 
among courts of the importance of counsel during the plea negotiations. ALI 
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE ~ 350.3 at 611 (975) (commen-
tary). See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 <1941> (where the Court found that 
if the prosecutor deceived the defendant into entering a guilty plea, this would 
be a deprivation of the defendant's constitutional rights); Anderson v. North 
Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.n.N.C. 1963) (plea bargain negotiated without 
counsel struck down); cf Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 <1977>. 
The Court discussed the importance of counsel when the defendant is alone 
with the police for extended lengths of time. Justice Stevens in concurrence 
stated: "[Tlhe lawyer is the essential medium through which the demands and 
commitments of the sovereign are communicated to the citizen. If, in the long 
run, we are seriously concerned about the individual's etTective representation 
by counsel, the State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise to this [sic) 
lawyer." [d. at 415. 
23. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 <1927>. 
24. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 0962>. 
25. Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 
1976>, cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 <1977>. For a discussion of Palermo, see 
Note, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 842 0977>. See also United States v. 
Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 1975>. 
26. Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 480. A graphic illustration is the case of 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 <1978>. In a five-to-four decision, the 
Supreme Court found that a prosecutor's threat to reindict the defendant under 
a Habitual Criminal Act if he did not plead guilty to the one count he was being 
charged with did not constitute retaliation when it was later carried out. The 
Court found that in the "'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such 
element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or 
reject the prosecution's otTer." [d. at 363. That the defendant truly possessed 
"freedom" to reject the prosecution's otTer was rigorously questioned by the four 
dissenting Justices. C{ Sweetwine v. State. 42 Md. App. 1. 12.398 A.2d 1262. 
1269 (1979) (discussion of the detrimental reliance bv defendants on a 
bargained plea, citing with approval Bordenhircher ('. Ha.,:es). 
27. 404 U.8. 257 <1971>. 
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involving facts in which the prosecutor's actions did constitute a 
breach under contract theory. In Santobello, the defendant withdrew 
a previous not guilty plea to two felony counts and pleaded guilty to 
a lesser, not-included offense in exchange for the prosecuting 
attorney's promise not to recommend a sentence at trial. In the 
course of the proceedings, a new prosecutor was appointed to the case 
and, at trial, this attorney recommended the maximum sentence 
possible, unaware of his predecessor's promise. The defendant 
challenged his sentence, claiming the prosecution had breached the 
plea agreement. Despite the sentencing judge's assertion that he was 
not influenced by the prosecutor's recommendation, the Court 
reversed the conviction and remanded the case, stating "that when a 
plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."28 Thus, the detriment 
suffered by the defendant in waiving his constitutional rights by 
pleading guilty, not the prosecutor's action (because his recommen-
dation did not influence the judge), was decisive. Also of importance 
to the Court was that the agreement had been reached through fair 
dealing.29 The defendant's detrimental reliance and the fairness of 
the agreement are criteria upon which subsequent courts have also 
focused. 3D The Santo bello Court noted that safeguards reasonably 
28. [d. at 262 (emphasis added). This holding, which greatly improved the 
defendant's position in plea negotiations, has been universally and unques-
tioningly cited. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 587 F.2d 678 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 975 (979); Cohen v. United States, 593 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 
1979); United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
McClintic, 570 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1978); Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven 
State Prison, 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.s. 911 (1977); 
United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Miller, 
565 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978); State v. Neitte, 
363 So. 2d 425 (La. 1978); Miller v. State, 272 Md. 249, 322 A.2d 527 (1974); 
State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 294 A.2d 57 (1972); Joiner v. State, 578 S.W.2d 
739 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Brooks v. Narick, 243 S.E.2d 841 (W. Va. 1978). 
29. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). 
30. United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 853 (7th Cir. 1978) (detriment in 
"adjudicative element" of a guilty plea would entitle defendant to dismissal of 
indictment upon prosecutorial breach); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 
428 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974) (defendant's reliance to his 
detriment upon plea agreement and subsequent breach by prosecution could be 
grounds for dismissal of indictment); United States v. Pavia, 294 F. Supp. 742 
m.D.C. 1969) (prejudice to the defendant required before indictment could be 
dismissed); State v. Reasbeck, 359 So. 2d 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) 
(defendant allowed to withdraw his plea after detrimentally relying on the 
breaching prosecutor's promise); DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1979) (prosecutor's withdrawal from the plea bargain before the defendant's 
entry of a plea was not reversible error because defendant had not shown any 
detrimental reliance on the bargain). But see State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9, 
11 <Iowa 1979) ("in the absence of a finding of abuse of prosecutorial discretion 
and resultant prejudice to defendant, it is improper for the trial judge to 
undertake to impose upon the prosecutor an agreement with terms he believes 
to be unwise"). See generally Legitimation of Plea Bargains. supra note 11, at 
784-85. 
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necessary to protect defendant's rights would vary with the circum-
stances.3l Furthermore, dicta contained in the decision can be 
interpreted to suggest that there is a constitutional right to specific 
performance of plea agreements.32 
The Cooper court found Santobello's constitutional mandate to 
provide a right, defined in part by contract law, to fair treatment 
throughout the entire plea process, from preliminary negotiations to 
in-court recommendations. 33 The Fourth Circuit stated that even 
though Santo bello had not developed the "precise source" or "specific 
content" of the protected rights of the defendant, "it was plain in 
context that the source was constitutional."34 This, the court 
believed, was authority to go beyond contract analysis in a situation 
in which this type of analysis would not have protected the defendant 
adequately. The court found that conduct that would be unfair in the 
market place would always be constitutionally unfair, but that the 
converse did not necessarily follow, because contract law is not 
concerned solely with fairness. 35 Stressing that plea bargaining 
involves the "barter" of constitutional rights, rather than the 
"barter" of goods or services, the Cooper court concluded that the 
"fortuities of communication" should not govern negotiations for the 
exchange of such invaluable rights.36 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit 
declined to stipulate at what point, short of some tangible reliance by 
the defendant upon the plea proposal, the right to specific perform-
ance arises.37 
Although the Cooper court did not establish a general rule, it did 
employ a well-reasoned, three-step analysis in making its determina-
tion. First, it identified the source of the defendant's rights. Second, 
it examined the facts of the case to determine whether these rights 
had been abridged or denied. Finally, it tested the rights against a 
standard of constitutional reasonableness. The source of the defen-
dant's rights was found to be "the right to fundamental fairness 
embraced within substantive due process guarantees," and the sixth 
amendment "right to effective assistance of counsel."38 The court 
31. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 
32. Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 515-21. 
33. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 16 (4th Cir. 1979). 
34. [d. at 15. 
35. [d. at 17. The Maryland courts, although not yet adopting the Cooper view, 
have found that "rigid application of contract law to plea bargains would be 
incongruous." State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 697, 357 A.2d 376, 382-83 
(1976). Strict application would be incongruous because the trial court usually 
is not bound by the plea agreement and a defendant could never be specifically 
,forced to plead guilty. [d. 
36. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1979l. 
37. [d. at 18. 
38. [d. 
1980] Cooper v. United States 301 
found the relevance of fundamental fairness to plea bargaining "too 
plain to require discussion."39 Regarding the abridgement of the 
defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, 
the court found that when a defendant learns of a government 
proposal through his attorney, subsequent withdrawal of that 
proposal by the government will erode the defendant's confidence in 
defense counsel's capability and professional integrity.40 Sixth 
amendment considerations should contribute to "a heightened degree 
of obligation to the government's fundamental duty to negotiate with 
scrupulous fairness in seeking guilty pleas."41 That defense counsel 
had been replaced before the trial was a strong indication to the 
court that the defendant had lost confidence in his first counselor.42 
In the final step of its analysis, keeping in mind the statement in 
Santo bello that a defendant is entitled only to that which is 
"reasonably due under the circumstances," the Cooper court tested 
the remedy of specific performance against this "reasonableness" 
standard. In reaching its determination on this issue, the court noted 
seven factors that it believed made specific performance appropriate: 
the proposal was made without any reservations as to approval; its 
c~nt was reasonable; the prosecutor had apparent authority to 
make such a proposal; the offer was promptly communicated to the 
defendant; the defendant assented promptly and unequivocally; his 
counsel promptly communicated his answer to the prosecutor; and no 
extenuating circumstances existed.43 Weighed against these factors 
were the practical burdens that a decree of specific performance 
would place upon the government. The court found the defendant's 
rights to be of greater weight for two reasons. First, the right to 
specific performance could arise only when an authorized prosecutor, 
rather than the defendant, voluntarily opened plea negotiations. 
Second, the court believed that requiring the prosecutors' office to 
"keep the left hand informed of the right's doing" was the mere 
imposition of a duty, rather than a burden, and therefore should not 
be weighed in the balance.44 Finding constitutional protection of the 
defendant's expectations reasonable under the circumstances,45 the 
court remanded the case for specific enforcement of the government's 
proposal. 
39. [d. 
40. [d. Defense counsel must be able to make firm assurances to the defendant. A 
plea, based on a contingency, which the defendant thought to be a firm offer 
may be invalid if the defendant's belief is reasonable. See United States v. 
Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971). 
41. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 19 (4th Cir. 1979). 
42. [d. at 19 n.9. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 20. 
45. [d. 
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V. STRENGTHENING DEFENDANTS' POSITION 
In redefining defendants' rights and remedies in plea negotia-
tions, Cooper builds upon Santobello46 by explicitly identifying the 
constitutional source of these rights and by expanding defendants' 
remedies. Cases decided after Brady7 but before Santobello had, for 
the most part, defined defendants' rights as contractual and had 
offered only one remedy - withdrawal of the guilty plea upon a 
prosecutorial breach.48 The Santo bello Court broadened defendants' 
remedies for breach by suggesting upon remand to the state court 
that either withdrawal of the plea or specific enforcement of the 
proposal could be considered. At that time specific performance was a 
remedy offered by only a small minority of courts. Although the 
Court's opinion did not explicitly state the constitutional source of 
the remedy of specific performance, the concurring opinions of four 
Justices indicate the nature of these underlying constitutional 
considerations. Justice Douglas, in his concurrence stated: 
I. . . favor a constitutional rule for this as well as for other 
pending or incoming cases. Where the "plea bargain" is not 
kept by the prosecutor, the sentence must be vacated and the 
state court will decide in light of the circumstances of each 
case whether due process requires (a) that there be specific 
performance of the plea bargain or (b) that the defendant be 
given the option to go on trial on the original charges. 49 
Three other Justices, Marshall, Brennan, and Stewart, partially 
concurred with the majority, stating that "when a prosecutor breaks 
the bargain, he undercuts the basis for the waiver of constitutional 
rights implicit in the plea."50 The unequivocal acceptance by the 
majority of jurisdictions51 of the validity of the .constitutional 
46. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
47- 397 U.S. 742 (1970>. 
48.J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS * 7.19[2) (1978>. See also Neely v. 
Pennsylvania, 411 U.S. 954, 956 n.4 (1973); United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 
496,501 (2d Cir. 1957); Sweetwine v. State, 42 Md. App. 1,4-6,398 A.2d 1262, 
1265 (1979). 
49. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267 !l971l. 
50. [d. at 268. 
51. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 593 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Cain, 587 F.2d 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975 (1979); United States v. 
Bowler, 585 F.2d 851 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. McClintic, 570 F.2d 685 
(8th Cir. 1978); Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison. 545 F.2d 286 
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Brown, 500 
F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978); State v. Neitte, 363 So. 2d 425 (La. 1978); 
Miller v. State, 272 Md. 249.322 A.2d 527 !l974); State v. Thomas. 61 N.J. 314, 
294 A.2d 57 (1972); Joiner v. State. 578 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 19791; 
Brooks v. Narick. 243 S.E.2d 841 (W. Va. 1978>. 
1980] Cooper v. United States 303 
considerations underlying the Court's decision in Santobello indi-
cates a movement in the direction of providing stronger constitution-
al safeguards for defendants' government-induced expectations. 52 
Cooper is the most recent decision broadening defendants' rights 
in the context of plea negotiations. Earlier stages in this trend were 
marked by courts' growing acceptance of specific performance as an 
appropriate remedy53 when the prosecution breaches a plea agree-
ment, and by courts' increasing willingness to find that a defendant 
has a right either to withdraw his plea or have it specifically 
enforced.54 The Cooper court, by declining to circumscribe defendants' 
rights by employing traditional contract theory, and by grounding' 
those rights firmly in the Constitution, takes an important further 
step. 
The court could do no less. A defendant's guilty plea after 
striking a plea bargain is tantamount to consent to the entry of a 
judgment of conviction without benefit of triaJ.55 It is a waiver of 
almost every fundamental constitutional right afforded a defendant 
in criminal proceedings. 56 Safeguards sufficient for dealings in the 
marketplace are ineffective when dealing with such precious consti-
tutional guarantees as the privilege against self-incrimination, trial 
by jury, confrontation of one's accusers, presentation of defense 
witnesses, and conviction by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.57 
52. One author has suggested that criminal defendants possess an emerging 
constitutional right to protection of reasonable expectations engendered by plea 
negotiations with the government. Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 528. 
His basis for asserting the existence of this emerging right is threefold: the 
analysis clarifies judicial interpretations of Santobello, satisfies our perceptions 
of fundamental fairness, and comports with other expectation interests which 
warrant constitutional protection (for example, double jeopardy or the contract 
clause of the Federal Constitution). [d. at 526. The author further suggests that 
this i!' the interpretation that state and lower courts have adopted. [d. at 
513-14, 518. 
53. Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 519. See, e.g., Palermo v. Warden, Green 
Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 
U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 
(1974); Commonwealth v. Zakrzewski, 460 Pa. 528, 533, 333 A.2d 898, 900 
(1975); State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash. 2d 579, 583, 564 P.2d 799, 802-03 
(1977). See also Legitimation of Plea Bargains, supra note 11, at 793-94. 
54. See, e.g., United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Thomas, 580 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 
(1979); State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687,699,357 A.2d 376, 384 <1976>. But see 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1980>. 
55. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970>. 
56. Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973>. 
57. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969); McCarthy v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 110, 361 A.2d 
113,117 (1976) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. at 466). See also 
Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises By Prosecutors To Secure Guilty 
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 871-72 (1964). 
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Finding that constitutional rights arise at an earlier stage in the 
. plea bargaining process than would contractual rights, the Cooper 
court held that specific enforcement of a prosecutor's proposal is 
compelled by the right to fundamental fairness found in the 
fourteenth amendment, and by the right to effective assistance of 
counsel found in the sixth amendment. 58 
In affording defendants protection throughout the entire plea 
negotiation process, the Cooper decision recognizes that the plea 
bargaining setting is a strange hybrid. It entails bargaining 
techniques from the open market, yet the "goods" being bartered are 
invaluable constitutional guarantees. Although both the defendant 
and prosecutor have bargainable assets with which to negotiate, they 
do not deal at arm's length. 59 The defendant is negotiating for 
freedom; the prosecutor for administrative convenience and a 
reduced work load. The stakes are much higher for the defendant 
because he or she must choose between certain incarceration and 
trial with the possibility of a more severe penalty. In contrast, the 
prosecutor will simply be adding another case to an already heavy 
caseload. Because the two parties are bartering with commodities of 
disproportionate values, a state's promise to a criminal defendant in 
exchange for the waiver of fundamental rights should be subjected to 
a particularly high standard.60 Waivers of constitutional rights 
should not be made to depend upon such fortuitous circumstances as 
who speaks first in a telephone conversation. A defendant cannot be 
asked to waive these rights without being able to rely upon receiving 
what has been offered in exchange. The burden of scrupulous 
fairness upon the state is ot unreasonable. Due process has always 
mandated such a requirement: "[T]his burden is the essence of due 
process of law. It is the State that tries a man, and it is the State that 
must insure that the trial is fair."61 
Aside from the constitutional issues, policy considerations also 
support the Cooper court's decision. Enforcement of prosecutorial 
promises by the courts will have advantages for prosecutors as well 
as for defendants. One of the reasons the courts have accepted plea 
bargaining is to ease the severe overcrowding in the criminal justice 
58. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 (4th Cir. 1979l. 
59. C{ Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) ("Plea bargaining flows 
from 'the mutuality of advantage' to defendants and prosecutors"l. For a 
discussion of this case, see Note, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 875 (1978>-
60. See Martinez v. Mancusi, 455 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.l, cert. denied". 409 U.S. 959, 962 
(1972) (Justices Marshall and Douglas dissenting from denial of certiorari); 
Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 524. In this situation, the state's 
extraordinary power and the critical nature of the proposals concerning 
criminal consequences to the defendant should place a higher standard upon 
the state. Id. 
61. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 809-10 (1972), 
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system.62 If the state cannot insure the benefit of plea bargains, 
defendants will be reluctant to enter into negotiations. 63 Moreover, 
until recently, plea bargaining was viewed as a less than acceptable 
practice. Even now, the technique does not enjoy unanimous 
acceptance,64 and the judicial approbation it has earned will be 
jeopardized should its use occasion prosecutorial abuse.65 Repudiation 
of promises through negligence or bad faith, deliberate harassment, 
and use of the plea proposal as a means of testing a defendant's 
confidence in his or her case are several of the abuses that could 
occur absent constitutional protection of a defendant's reasonable 
expectations.66 Such misconduct lends support to critics' arguments 
condemning plea bargaining and will erode whatever respectability 
the technique has gained. Furthermore, a prosecutor compromises 
professional integrity and weakens the state's case by breaching a 
plea agreement.67 As stated by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. 
Carter, in addition to the defendant's interest, of critical importance 
is the "honor of the government[,] public confidence in the fair 
62. See Legitimation of Plea Bargains, supra note 11, at 772. 
63. Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 512. 
64. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS Courts ** 46-49 (1973). In calling for the 
abolition of all plea bargaining, the Commission found the major vices of the 
technique to be "reduced rationality" in the criminal process, a higher risk of 
convicting innocent defendants, and an increase in defendants' burden to 
exercise their constitutional rights - that is, to stand trial. Id. at 610-11. The 
Commission stated that the disposition of criminal cases should not be "a 
contest where the government's success is necessarily measured by the number 
of convictions it obtains, regardless of the methods used." Neely v. Pennsylva-
nia, 449 Pa. 3, 295 A.2d 75 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 954, 958 (1973) 
(Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
See also Legitimation of Plea Bargains, supra note 11, at 774; Note, The 
Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970>. 
65. "There is no doubt that the breadth of discretion that our country's legal system 
vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual 
and institutional abuse. And broad though that discretion may be, there are 
undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 
434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). See also Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 20 (4th 
Cir. 1979) ("[AJ failure to find a constitutional right and violation in this case 
would necessarily give judicial approval to a practice whose possibilities for 
easy abuse, or at least the appearance of abuse, are abundantly clear."). 
66. See United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 854 (7th Cir. 1978); In re 
Palodichuk, 22 Wash. App. 107, 110, 589 P.2d 269, 271 (1978); Broken Plea 
Bargains, supra note 4, at 526. Published guidelines for plea negotiations do 
exist. See ABA PLEAS, supra note 2, at * 3.1; ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE * 350.3 (1975); FED. R CRIM. P. l1(e). These guidelines 
are only skeletal, however, and leave much to the discretion of the prosecutor. 
67. State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Iowa 1979>. Even though the Edwards 
court rejected the Cooper holding, it did state that "we do not condone hasty 
plea proposals or casual withdrawals." The court did not, however, suggest how 
such casual withdrawals should be remedied when there has been no tangible 
detrimental reliance. 
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administration of justice, and the efficient administration of jus-
tice."68 
The expansion of defendants' rights in plea negotiations effected 
by Cooper makes it increasingly important that prosecutors revise 
their plea bargaining tactics. The prosecutor's office must act as a 
unit, rather than "an amalgam of separate entities. [It] is an entity 
and as such it is the spokesman for the Government."69 When an 
offer has been made, it is reasonable for the defendant to rely on the. 
apparent authority of the prosecutor as a representative of the 
government, if not in the classic contract sense, then at least 
psychologically.70 
A prosecutor's apparent authority should be enough to bind the 
government to its proposal; disagreements between a prosecutor and 
his superior after a proposal is offered should have no effect." 
Admittedly, prosecutors' offices are notoriously overworked and 
understaffed, but even that is not sufficient reason to compromise 
defendants' constitutional rights. Defendants should be clearly 
advised whenever a prosecutor's proposal is conditional pending 
approval of a superior.72 An inadvertent breach occasioned by a lack 
of communication among prosecutors has the same effect on the 
defendant as an intentional breach.73 
Rules and procedures74 established in each prosecutor's office 
would help to eli~inate uncertainties that might result in the 
68. United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972) (if such a promise 
existed, the promise of federal agents in Washington, D.C., that no other 
prosecutions would be brought against the defendant elsewhere would be 
enforced). 
69. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786,809-10 (1972) (quoting S&E Contractors, Inc. v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972». 
70. Broken Plea Bargains, supra note 4, at 526. This type of reliance is as injurious 
as tangible reliance because of the serious consequences and the greater 
resources and expertise arrayed against the defendant. 
71. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 19 (4th Cir. 1979>. 
72, The proposal should include any reservations as to performance or approval, 
including judicial approval. See FEn. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2)·(4>. 
73. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. 
Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 1975); Correale v. United States, 479 
F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973>. 
Many courts addressing plea bargain breaches have found the actual effect 
of the breach irrelevant. They assert that the defendant's reliance and the 
breach itself are of greater importance. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 
262 (breach found even though the trial judge stated that he had been 
unaffected by the prosecutor's actions); Harris v. Superintendent. Va. State 
Penitentiary, 518 F.2d 1173. 1174 (4th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor's failure to make 
a recommendation to the court held a breach even though the recommendation 
would not bind the court>; United States v. Brown. 500 F.2d 375. 378 (4th Cir. 
1974) (for prosecutor just to go through the motions honoring a promise not 
sufficient to fulfill the promise). 
74. See ALI MODEl. Com: OF PH~:·AHHAIN(:MEr-;T PH()('EDI'H~: * 350.3. note at 613; 
Legitimation of Plea Bar{?aills. supra note 11. at 799. SeC' al.~() United States v. 
Fischetti. 475 F. Supp. 1145. 1151 (O.N.J. 19791. 
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eventual repudiation of a plea bargain, as occurred in Cooper. An 
agreement, once reached, should be reduced to writing.75 In addition, 
any contingency subjecting the proposal to a superior's final approval 
should be made a part of the written agreement so as to avoid any 
misunderstandings.76 Oilly attorneys who are trusted to offer reason-
able proposals should be allowed to negotiate. Certainly, an assistant 
attorney and the attorney's superior should discuss limits on the 
proposal before negotiations are begun. 
A further step, and one which is already required by the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure,77 is the disclosure of the plea agreement 
in court, on the record. 78 A written agreement would facilitate this 
objective. In Cooper, there was a misunderstanding as to acceptance 
and approvaJ.79 Quite possibly a firm written proposal would have 
eliminated that misunderstanding. 
Overall, the intention should be to make all negotiations open 
and above board. Subterfuge and secrecy can only hinder negotia-
tions and create confusion. If the "left hand" is to know what the 
"right" is doing, closer supervision of plea proposals is needed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Cooper will promote further acceptance of plea bargaining. The 
constitutional protection afforded defendants by this decision and the 
growing openness of plea bargaining will help to remove the tarnish 
that this practice has acquired over the years. It is appropriate that a 
process that entails waiver of constitutional rights be scrutinized 
using constitutional standards. More courts must come to the same 
conclusion as did the court in Cooper if full protection is to be 
afforded defendants in plea negotiations.80 
Judith A Wood 
75. Legitimation of Plea Bargains, supra note 11, at 799. 
76. See note 71 supra. 
77. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1HeH2). 
78. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (notes appended to 1974 amendments); Legitimation of 
Plea Bargains, supra note 11, at 799. 
79. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 15 n.2 (4th Cir. 1979). 
80. But see Government of Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1980). 
In this recent case, the Third Circuit did not agree with the Fourth Circuit 
decision in Cooper, although it is unclear whether the Scotland court expressly", 
rejected Cooper. The Scotland court noted that the factual situation before it 
was very similar to that in Cooper, but rejected the Cooper court's argument 
even though noting that the government's actions had been far from exemplary. 
The major point of the Scotland opinion was that trial itself is an adequate 
remedy for a repudiated proposal, and that a Cooper-type rule was an 
unwarranted intrusion into prosecutorial discretion. 
